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Reflections on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo:
Interpreting Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)
Forthcoming in THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE KOSOVO ADVISORY OPINION
(Michael Wood & Marko Milanovic eds., Oxford University Press)
Sean D. Murphy1

1.

Introduction

A key aspect of the substantive legal arguments in the advisory opinion proceedings,
and the focus of paragraphs 85-121 of the Court’s opinion, was the meaning and effects of
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999.2 Adopted immediately after the
cessation of NATO’s bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY), which had forced the FRY to agree to withdraw its military and police forces from
Kosovo, the resolution served several purposes. First, it brought the United Nations back
into play as the central institution for authorizing measures to maintain peace and security
in the Balkans. Having been sidelined during the NATO intervention, the Council and the
Secretary-General resumed their roles as key decision-makers charged with stabilizing the
situation in Kosovo.

Second, the resolution set forth the central elements for achieving that objective,
notably the deployment of both a military component (NATO’s international security force
in Kosovo or KFOR) to Kosovo and a civilian component (the UN Mission in Kosovo or
UNMIK). The dominant concern of the Council at the time was to establish the role of the
international community during the interim period, meaning the period before Kosovo’s
final status was resolved. In paragraph 1 of Resolution 1244, the Council stated that a
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political solution to the 1999 Kosovo crisis would be based on the general principles
expressed in Annexes 1 and 2 to the resolution, which were the principles on which
NATO’s military campaign were brought to a close. Those principles spoke to ending
violence in Kosovo, withdrawal of FRY and Serbian military and police forces from
Kosovo, the deployment of UNMIK and KFOR to Kosovo, the safe return of refugees, the
establishment of an interim political framework for the self-government of Kosovo, and
efforts toward economic development of Kosovo. Paragraphs 2 through 4 of the resolution
then indicated the various steps for withdrawal of FRY and Serbian forces, while
paragraphs 5 through 11 elaborated on the deployment of the international military and
civilian presences to Kosovo. In short, most of the resolution was devoted to the immediate
post-conflict phase, detailing the basic elements for the foreign military and civilian
presence that would deploy to Kosovo, thereby filling the vacuum brought about by the
withdrawal of FRY and Serbian governmental authority.

Third, the resolution briefly addressed the process for determining Kosovo’s longterm fate, but this portion of the resolution was vague and under-developed. The only
operative part of the resolution relating to final status appears in paragraph 11, which set
forth the responsibilities of the international civilian presence. Though most of the
paragraph 11 is concerned with the interim period, subparagraphs 11(e) and (f) provide that
the international civilian presence’s responsibilities include:

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status,
taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement.

Hence, a key problem for both sides in the Kosovo proceedings was that most of
Resolution 1244 simply was not directed at the issue of Kosovo’s final status, and the few
provisions that were so directed provided little detail.

Even so, in the aftermath of Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 18 February
2008, Resolution 1244 emerged as a lightning rod for legal arguments on both sides. The
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resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the decisions contained
therein were directly binding on all UN Member States. Yet because its language with
respect to the final status of Kosovo was vague and incomplete, neither side had had an
obvious claim that Resolution 1244 supported its position.

Further, while both sides sought to use the resolution to their advantage, they were
fully aware that the Court would approach its interpretation from a perspective that
transcended the confines of the case. Neither side could craft its position in a way that
impugned the power or authority of the Security Council or of the Secretary-General, for
doing so risked an adverse decision from a Court that, in all likelihood, would be disposed
to protect the prerogatives of its collateral UN organs. Neither side could advance
interpretations of the resolution that were seen as promoting secessionist movements in
other contexts, such as Northern Cyprus or Republika Srpska. Further, both sides were
aware that finding a Council prohibition on Kosovo’s declaration would likely necessitate
the Court’s consideration of whether Kosovo had a right to ‘remedial secession,’ an issue
the Court might prefer to avoid. Indeed, addressing that issue might require the Court to
opine on whether a Security Council decision under Chapter VII is invalid if it infringes
upon a right of self-determination, often viewed as a norm that has acquired the status of
jus cogens. Finally, both sides had to grapple with the unusual circumstance of applying
the resolution to the conduct of a non-state actor; while Security Council resolutions may
clearly bind UN Member States, whether they can and do bind persons or groups of
persons is far less clear.

This chapter addresses the arguments of both sides and the advisory opinion’s
substantive ruling on the consistency of Kosovo’s declaration with Security Council
Resolution 1244. Part 2 addresses the five legal core arguments regarding the legality of
the declaration in relation to Resolution 1244. Part 3 then examines several ramifications
of this portion of the advisory opinion for future interpretation of Security Council
resolutions.

2.

Core Legal Arguments Concerning the Consistency of the Declaration of
Independence with Resolution 1244

3

Although there were many variations in the arguments that were made to the Court
regarding the interpretation of Resolution 1244, there were five core arguments around
which those variations revolved. First, did Resolution 1244 contain a prohibition, express
or implied, on Kosovo’s declaration, at least in the absence of Serbia’s consent? Second,
given that Resolution 1244 provided that the final status process must take into account the
March 1999 Rambouillet accords, did those accords require Serbian consent to the
determination of Kosovo’s final status? Third, did the final status process envisaged by
Resolution 1244, which commenced in 2005 under the auspices of the Special Envoy of
the UN Secretary-General (former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari), conclude prior to
the issuance of the declaration, or was it not yet completed such that the declaration was an
unlawful interference in that process? Fourth, even if the declaration did not directly
violate Resolution 1244, was it nevertheless a violation of the legal régime set up in
Kosovo under the resolution (e.g., an ultra vires act of the Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment (PISG) or a contravention of Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework for
Provisional

Self-Government

promulgated

by

the

Secretary-General’s

Special

Representative in Kosovo (SRSG) in May 2001)? Finally, what implication, if any, might
be drawn from the fact that UN officials – who were authorized to set aside inconsistent
measures by authorities in Kosovo – did not set aside the declaration? Did this support the
proposition that the issuance of the declaration did not violate Resolution 1244 or was it
irrelevant to the declaration’s legality?

A.

Did Resolution 1244 Directly Prohibit the Declaration?
Serbia and those states supporting Serbia’s position asserted that Resolution 1244

directly prohibited Kosovo’s declaration of independence. In advancing this position,
Serbia and its supporters emphasized three points.

First, the resolution’s preamble reaffirmed ‘the commitment of all Member States to
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.’3 That
affirmation was an express recognition by the Security Council that the territorial
arrangements in existence as of 1999 would remain intact, at least in the absence of some
agreement by the FRY regarding Kosovo’s secession. Although the FRY would over time
3

4

SC Res. 1244, pmbl. and para. 10.

change, renaming itself ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ in 2003 and consenting to the
independence of Montenegro in 2006, the same general principle remained concerning the
territorial integrity of Serbia in 2008. As such, the resolution expressly precluded the
issuance of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.4 Other aspects of the resolution were
also stressed, such as the reference to resolving the humanitarian situation in ‘Kosovo,
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ in the fourth paragraph of Resolution 1244’s preamble,5
the reference to Kosovo enjoying substantial autonomy ‘within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia’ in the tenth operative paragraph,6 and the provisions allowing for small
numbers of Yugoslav and Serbian military and police personnel to return to Kosovo and
perform tasks clearly linked with sovereignty.7

Second, Serbia and its supporters made extensive reference to the background to
Resolution 1244, noting that prior UN Security Council resolutions addressing the conflict
in Kosovo—such as resolutions 1160 (1998), 1190 (1998), 1203 (1998), and 1239
(1999)—had also expressed a commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
FRY.8 Similarly, they pointed to statements made by the Contact Group,9 the President of
the Security Council,10 the chairman of the meeting of G-8 foreign ministers,11 and the
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See First Written Statement of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (17 April 2009), 249, paras. 675
–76, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15642.pdf (Serbia First Written Statement); see
also First Written Statement of the Republic of Cyprus (17 April 2009), 23, para. 92, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15609.pdf (Cyprus First Written Statement) (stating the
‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia is unambiguously confirmed’ in the preamble to Resolution
1244 and ‘provides the lens through which all other provisions should be interpreted’).

5

See, e.g., First Written Statement of the Kingdom of Spain (14 April 2009), 25, para. 37, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15644.pdf (Spain First Written Statement).

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid.

8

See, e.g., Spain First Written Statement (n 5), 24, para. 35; Verbatim Record of the Oral Argument of the
Government of Serbia (1 December 2009) CR 2009/24, 68, paras. 15–16, available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/141/15710.pdf (Serbia Oral Argument).

9

Serbia First Written Statement (n 4), 244, para. 658 (noting the Contact Group—comprising France,
Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—issued a statement supporting an
enhanced status for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

10

Ibid., 244–45, para. 659.

11

Ibid., 247, para. 667.
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Military Technical Agreement at the end of NATO’s bombing campaign between the
KFOR and the FRY12 as confirming the latter’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Third, Serbia and its supporters drew a distinction between Resolution 1244 and a
Security Council resolution adopted the following day,13 Resolution 1246 on the
international legal status of East Timor.14 Resolution 1246 established a UN Mission in
East Timor (UNAMET) ‘to organize and conduct a popular consultation . . . on the basis of
a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people
accept the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East
Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia or reject the proposed special autonomy for
East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia.’15 According to Serbia, the
fact ‘no such provision had been inserted in resolution 1244’ showed a lack of support in
the Security Council to allow for the unilateral separation of Kosovo.16 Moreover, Serbia
argued that the lack of any such provision, when coupled with the formal reaffirmation of
its territorial integrity in Resolution 1244, necessarily ‘precluded the possibility of Kosovo
unilaterally seceding.’17

By contrast, Kosovo and those states supporting its position argued that no such
prohibition existed in Resolution 1244. They noted that there was no reference of any kind
in Resolution 1244 to a declaration or statement by Kosovo leaders, let alone a reference
that prohibited such a declaration. With respect to the preambular language on ‘territorial
integrity,’ Kosovo and its supporters argued that such language referred to territorial
integrity ‘as set out in Annex 2’ of the resolution. In Annex 2, the issue of ‘territorial
integrity’ related solely to the ‘interim political framework,’ not to the point of achieving a
final status. As such, the preambular language was relevant to the establishment by the
SRSG in 2001 Constitutional Framework for ‘Provisional Self-Government’ in Kosovo,18
12

Ibid., para. 668.

13

See Serbia Oral Argument (n 8), 51, para. 9.

14

SC Res. 1246 (1999).

15

Ibid., para. 1

16

Serbia Oral Argument (n 8), 51, para. 10.

17

Ibid., para. 11.

18

Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9,
15 May 2001, in Dossier Submitted on Behalf of the Secretary-General pursuant to Article 65, paragraph
2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Dossier), at No. 156.

6

which did respect the concept of Kosovo being a part of the FRY during the interim period.
Yet, according to Kosovo and its supporters, neither this Constitutional Framework, nor
the references to ‘territorial integrity’ in Resolution 1244, purported to address the issue of
Kosovo’s final status. Other arguments were also deployed regarding the preambular
language, such as its reference to ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ and not ‘Serbia,’ and
that the principle of territorial integrity related to inter-state relations, not the conduct
within a state of a non-state entity.19

Kosovo and its supporters also drew contrasts between Resolution 1244 and other
Security Council resolutions, focusing on resolutions where the Council adopted language
that appeared to preclude or at least disfavor the emergence of a new state. Thus, contrast
was made with Security Council Resolution 787, which was adopted in 1992.20 In
paragraph 3 of that resolution, the Council considered the possibility of a declaration of
independence by the leaders of Republika Srpska within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Apparently
concerned that such a declaration might be issued, the Security Council expressly affirmed
that it would not accept ‘any entities unilaterally declared’. According to Kosovo and its
supporters, the lack of any such language in Resolution 1244 made clear that the Council
did not preclude the possible issuance of a declaration of independence by the
representatives of the people of Kosovo. Further, the Council’s approach in Resolution 787
(stating that it would not accept the declaration rather than forbidding the declaration) was
consistent with the contention of Kosovo and its supporters that generally the Security
Council does not seek to regulate entities other than states.21

To similar effect, contrast was made with Resolution 1251 (1999), which was
adopted in the same month as Resolution 1244. In Resolution 1251, the Council considered
the situation of northern Cyprus and stated, in paragraph 11, that:

‘a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and
international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial
integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described
19

First Written Contribution of the Republic of Kosovo (17 April 2009), paras. 9.29–9.36, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15678.pdf (KWC).

20

SC Res. 787, para. 3 (1992); see infra section 3(D).

21

Second Written Contribution of the Republic of Kosovo (17 July 2009), paras. 5.67–5.74, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15708.pdf (KWC (Second)).
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in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation,
and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other
country or any form of partition or secession.’22
In Resolution 1244, by contrast, there was no language indicating that a political settlement
on Kosovo had to be based on Serbia or the FRY with a ‘single sovereignty and
international personality,’ or that the political settlement must ‘exclude secession’.

A third contrast was made with respect the situation that unfolded in Georgia in
1999. In Resolution 1225 of January 1999 and in Resolution 1255 of July 1999, the
Council expressly called for a ‘settlement on the political status of Abkhazia within the
State of Georgia.’23 In other words, the Council expressly stated that the settlement must
be one that involved Abkhazia remaining within the sovereign state of Georgia. Yet no
similar language existed in Resolution 1244.

The problem faced by Kosovo and its supporters was that Resolution 1244 did not
expressly envisage a determination of Kosovo’s final status based solely upon a
referendum or other measure taken by the people of Kosovo. Yet the problem faced by
Serbia and its supporters was that Resolution 1244 did not expressly preclude any such
outcome. While many states in 1999 probably expected that Kosovo would ultimately
remain within Serbia as a (perhaps highly) autonomous province, a different final status of
independence was also possible. Hence, Kosovo and its supporters made ample use of
statements by relevant actors that Resolution 1244 did not, by itself, determine Kosovo’s
final status.24 Indeed, many of the key participants in the process, including the Secretary-

22

SC Res. 1251, para. 11 (1999).

23

SC Res. 1225, para. 3 (1999); SC Res. 1255, para. 5 (1999) (emphasis added).

24

8

For example, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations at the time, Hans Corell, later opined (in his private
capacity) that Resolution 1244 per se ‘does not guarantee that Serbia would have maintained Kosovo
within its border’ and ‘that the resolution does not foresee that Kosovo should remain within the borders
of Serbia.’ Corell, ‘Remarks’, Proc. Am. Soc. Int’l L. (2008) 134.

General,25 the SRSG,26 Members of the Security Council,27 and even Serbia itself, referred
to Resolution 1244 as establishing a ‘status-neutral’ framework.28

Ultimately, the Court accepted the position advanced by Kosovo and its supporters
that the resolution did not forbid a declaration of independence. First, the Court agreed that
the resolution’s preamble did not, by its terms, forbid a declaration of independence. While
Resolution 1244 ‘was essentially designed to create an interim régime’ for governing
Kosovo with a view to settling Kosovo’s final status through a political process, it ‘did not
contain any provision dealing with the final status of Kosovo or with the conditions for its
achievement.’29 Second, citing Resolution 1251 on the situation in Cyprus as an example,
the Court held that the contemporaneous practice of the Security Council had shown that
when it decided to set restrictive conditions on the permanent status of a territory, it
specified those conditions in the relevant resolution.30 Unlike Resolution 1251, the Court
reasoned that the terms of Resolution 1244 ‘did not reserve for [the Security Council] the
final determination of the situation in Kosovo and remained silent on the conditions for the
final status of Kosovo.’31 Third, the Court concluded that Resolution 1244 was primarily
concerned with creating obligations for UN Member States and UN organs, with two
exceptions not relevant to the declaration of independence.32 Thus, Resolution 1244 did not
intend to impose ‘a specific obligation to act or a prohibition from acting’33 that would
apply to the authors of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.34

25

See, e.g., S/2009/300, para. 6.

26

See, e.g., S/PV.6144, at 4.

27

See, e.g., ibid., at 10 (Vietnam); ibid., at 15 (China); ibid., at 19 (Uganda); S/PV.6202, at 20 (China).

28

See, e.g., S/PV.6202, at 7 (statement of Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremić).

29

30

Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo
(Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, 449, para. 114 (Kosovo Advisory Opinion); but see Dissenting
Op. Judge Koroma, [2010] ICJ Rep. 467, 470, para. 11 (finding that ‘the declaration of independence
violates the provision of that resolution calling for a political solution based on respect for the territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the autonomy of Kosovo’); ibid., 471, para. 13.
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 449, para. 114.

31

Ibid.

32

Ibid., 449–50, para. 115

33

Ibid., 450, para. 115.

34

Ibid., 451, para. 118.
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Given that Resolution 1244 did not expressly forbid a declaration of independence,
Serbia and its supporters also advanced a variation of this argument. Since Resolution 1244
contemplated a final status process, conclusion of that process necessarily entailed consent
by Serbia (the state in whose territory Kosovo existed) or at least acceptance by the
Security Council. Specifically, the terms ‘political process’ in subparagraph 11(e) and
‘political settlement’ in subparagraph 11(f) of the resolution had to envisage Serbian
consent to Kosovo’s final status because the establishment of a political process ‘implies
that all parties . . . have to find a mutually agreeable solution through negotiation.’35 The
fact that Resolution 1244 only provided for power to transfer from Kosovo’s provisional
institutions to institutions established under a ‘political settlement’ necessarily meant there
must be an ‘agreement, not a unilateral measure taken by one of the parties.’36 Moreover,
Serbia and its supporters argued respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity is a
rule of jus cogens, which cannot be undermined by a Security Council resolution without
the consent of the state.37

In the alternative, they maintained that the interim status of Kosovo under UN
administration within Serbia remained in force until the Security Council decided
otherwise.38 Otherwise, Serbia asked the Court, why would the Security Council have
contemplated negotiations in the first place if one side could unilaterally terminate them at
will, and why did Resolution 1244 provide for the interim régime to stay in place until the
Security Council terminated it?39 This argument maintained that it is not the declaration of
independence per se that violated Resolution 1244 but, instead, the issuance of such a
declaration without Serbia’s consent or prior to a Security Council decision to end the final
status settlement process.

In response, Kosovo and its supporters maintained that Resolution 1244 nowhere
provided for approval by Serbia of Kosovo’s final status. Had the Security Council decided
35

Serbia First Written Statement (n 4), 269, para. 753.

36

Ibid., para. 754; see also Second Written Statement of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (14 July
2009), 177, para. 437, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15686.pdf (Serbia Second
Written Statement) (noting the term ‘settlement’ used in Resolution 1244 is the same used in the UN
Charter, where it precludes unilateral methods).

37

Serbia Second Written Statement (n 366), 122, paras. 288–89.

38

Serbia First Written Statement (n 4), 282–88, paras. 800–23.

39

Serbia Oral Argument (n 8), 54, para. 26.
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that such consent must exist prior to resolution of Kosovo’s status, they argued that the
Council could have said so, but did not. Among other things, they noted that Council
resolutions pre-dating Resolution 1244 had gone so far as to call for negotiations between
Belgrade and Pristina,40 but that in Resolution 1244 even that language was dropped.
Rather, when the time came – as contemplated by Resolution 1244 – the United Nations
facilitated the final status talks that were launched in 2005 and concluded then in 2007,
without any resistance or interference from Kosovo authorities.

The Court did not view Resolution 1244 as requiring Serbia’s consent to Kosovo’s
independence. Rather, it decided that ‘resolution 1244 (1999) clearly establishes an interim
régime; it cannot be understood as putting in place a permanent institutional framework in
the territory of Kosovo. This resolution mandated UNMIK merely to facilitate the desired
negotiated solution for Kosovo’s future status, without prejudging the outcome of the
negotiating process.’41 Although it may have been expected that the final status of Kosovo
would be developed with the framework established by Resolution 1244, the Court appears
to have agreed with Kosovo that the resolution only required that UNMIK facilitate a
political process and oversee a final transition, while leaving open the contours and
outcome of the final settlement process.

B.

Did Resolution 1244 Indirectly Prohibit the Declaration through its Reference to
the Rambouillet Accords?
As noted above, paragraph 11(e) of Resolution 1244 referred to ‘a political process

designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet
accords.’ The Rambouillet accords were a key backdrop to the intervention by NATO in
Kosovo. In 1998, as the crisis began unfolding in Kosovo, the ‘Contact Group’ (consisting
of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) tasked U.S.
Ambassador Christopher Hill with achieving an agreement that would stabilize the
unfolding Kosovo crisis. Hill’s efforts led to a draft agreement commonly referred to as the

40
41

KWC (n 19), para. 5.32.
Kosovo Advisory Opinion (n 29), 444, para. 99; but see Dissenting Op. Judge Koroma, [2010] ICJ Rep.
467, 473, para. 16 (finding that ‘reference to a future ‘settlement’ of the conflict, in my view, excludes the
making of the unilateral declaration of independence. By definition, ‘settlement’ in this context
contemplates a resolution brought about by negotiation.’).
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Rambouillet accords, after the château where the negotiations were conducted. Like
Resolution 1244, the Rambouillet accords envisaged an interim period of substantial
Kosovo autonomy followed by a final settlement; indeed, the formal title of the accords
was ‘Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo’. Though never signed
by Serbia, and therefore never brought into force, the accords were known to the members
of the Security Council in 1999 when they adopted Resolution 1244 and hence the
reference in paragraph 11(e). Both sides appearing before the Court sought to use those
accords to their advantage.

Serbia and its supporters approached the Rambouillet accords by noting that they
recalled ‘the commitment of the international community to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,’42 thus supporting the idea that Kosovo
would remain a unit within the FRY (or later Serbia). Additionally, they noted that the
Rambouillet accords incorporated the Helsinki Final Act as a legal parameter for
determining the final status of Kosovo, which inter alia provided that ‘the frontiers of all
States in Europe shall be inviolable,’43 again signaling a desire not to infringe upon the
territorial integrity of the FRY. Thus, when Resolution 1244 provided for the Rambouillet
accords to be taken into account in the political process to determine Kosovo’s status, it
meant that the Security Council envisaged Kosovo remaining within the sovereignty of the
FRY.44

For their part, Kosovo and its supporters parsed closely the relevant texts of the four
drafts considered during the so-called ‘Hill Process’ that presaged the Rambouillet accords,
in an effort to show that the idea of a Belgrade-Pristina mutual agreement on final status
was rejected and replaced with the idea of a final status settlement based on various
factors, the first of which was the ‘will of the people’ of Kosovo.45 Like Resolution 1244
itself, they noted that all four drafts were principally focused on establishing an interim
42

Serbia First Written Statement (n 4), 277, para. 782 (quoting the Interim Agreement for Peace and SelfGovernment in Kosovo, pmbl. and para. 4 (Rambouillet accords)); Cyprus First Written Statement (n 4),
23, para. 93.

43

Ibid., para. 783.

44

Ibid., para. 784; see also Serbia Oral Argument (n 8), 71–72, para. 25 (arguing the lack of a prohibition
on Kosovo declaring independence in the Rambouillet accords was not significant because the territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been repeatedly reaffirmed and it ‘would in reality
have been redundant to prohibit expressly any attempt at unilateral independence’).

45

KWC (Second) (n 21), paras. 5.05–5.18.
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solution, one designed to create the immediate conditions for the return to a peaceful and
normal life for the inhabitants of Kosovo. Near the end of the Hill drafts, however, a
single clause briefly addressed the process for Kosovo’s final status. The first Hill proposal
included an express requirement that the final status determination would require ‘mutual
agreement’ of both Belgrade and Pristina.46 The second47 and third48 Hill proposals
repeated this final provision almost verbatim. The fourth and final Hill proposal of 27
January 1999, however, was different. Though placed in brackets, it read:

‘In three years, there shall be a comprehensive assessment of this Agreement under
international auspices with the aim of improving its implementation and determining
whether to implement proposals by either side for additional steps, by a procedure to
be determined taking into account the Parties’ roles in and compliance with this
Agreement.’49
Kosovo and its supporters noted that in this last version of the Hill proposals,
reference to the ‘mutual agreement’ was dropped, replaced by an approach to Kosovo’s
final status that would involve a ‘comprehensive assessment’ under ‘international auspices’
by a ‘procedure’ that would ‘take into account’ the two sides’ roles and compliance with
the agreement.

Two days later, the Contact Group called upon the parties to meet at Rambouillet for
further negotiations. Kosovo and its supporters noted that, like the final Hill proposal, the
initial draft of the Rambouillet Interim Agreement did not assert that Kosovo’s final status
should be determined by ‘mutual agreement’ between Kosovo and Serbia, or otherwise
required Serbia’s consent; rather, it drew upon the relevant clause from the final Hill

46

In the first Hill proposal of 1 October 1998, the relevant clause stated: ‘In three years, the sides will
undertake a comprehensive assessment of the Agreement, with the aim of improving its implementation
and considering proposals by either side for additional steps, which will require mutual agreement for
adoption.’ Ibid., para. 5.07 (emphasis added).

47

In the second Hill proposal of 1 November 1998, the relevant clause stated: ‘In three years, the sides will
undertake a comprehensive assessment of the Agreement, with the aim of improving the implementation
and considering proposals by either side for additional steps, which will require mutual agreement for
adoption.’ Ibid.

48

In the third Hill proposal of 2 December 1998, the relevant clause stated: ‘In three years, the Parties will
undertake a comprehensive assessment of the Agreement, with the aim of improving its implementation
and considering proposals by either side for additional steps, which will require mutual agreement for
adoption.’ Ibid.

49

Ibid., para. 5.08 (emphasis added).
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proposal.50 For the final version of the Ramboullet accords, the clause was further
amended to read:

‘Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall
be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis
of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party’s efforts regarding
the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a
comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider
proposals by any Party for additional measures.’51
For Kosovo and its supporters, the progression of text from the first Hill proposal of
October 1998 to the final version of the Rambouillet accords of March 1999 demonstrated
that the concept of a Belgrade-Pristina mutual agreement on final status had been dropped,
and replaced with the idea of a final status settlement based on various factors, the first of
which was the ‘will of the people’ of Kosovo.52 That interpretation, they contended, was
confirmed by Serbia’s failed effort to revise the clause noted above so as to read as
follows:
‘After three years, the signatories shall comprehensively review this Agreement with a
view to improving its implementation and shall consider the proposals of any
signatory for additional measures, whose adoption shall require the consent of all
signatories.’53
Since that proposal was rejected at Rambouillet, in part prompting Serbia to reject the
Rambouillet accords, Kosovo and its supporters maintained that the accords contemplated
a final status process in which the ‘the will of the people’ was assigned a pivotal role, and
in which there was no requirement of Serbian consent.
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Part of the difficulty for Serbia and its supporters in trying to use the Rambouillet
accords to their advantage before the Court was Serbia’s rejection of those accords. Indeed,
Serbia had stated to the Security Council shortly after the Rambouillet meeting that the
‘solution’ proposed constituted an ‘ultimatum’ in which Belgrade was being asked to
voluntarily give up Kosovo.54 Further, in explaining to the Council its rejection of the
Rambouillet accords, Belgrade asserted that it ‘cannot agree to the secession of Kosovo
and Metohija, either immediately or after the interim period of three years’.55 Kosovo and
its supporters pointed to such statements as admissions by Serbia that the Rambouillet
accords could not be interpreted as requiring Serbian consent to independence.
The Court seemingly accepted the position advanced by Kosovo and its supporters
that the reference to the Rambouillet accords in Resolution 1244 did not signal a
requirement that Serbia consent to the resolution of Kosovo’s final status. After noting that
the references to the Rambouillet accords could support the view that Resolution 1244
contemplated the possibility of a declaration of independence, 56 the Court avoided
discussing the issue in detail by simply deciding that the Security Council did not intend by
such a reference to create legal obligations prohibiting the authors of the declaration from
proclaiming independence.57

C.

Was the Declaration Inconsistent with the Political Process for Final Status
Envisaged by Resolution 1244?
If Resolution 1244 did not itself directly or indirectly prohibit the issuance of the

declaration, might it be said that the resolution nevertheless envisaged the unfolding of a
political process for the resolution of Kosovo’s final status, a process that was never
fulfilled and was even aborted by Kosovo’s declaration? If so, then it might be said that the
declaration was not ‘in accordance’ with Resolution 1244.
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The basic process that occurred was as follows. The Secretary-General’s Special
Envoy in Kosovo, Ambassador Kai Eide, in October 2005 reported that the interim
situation in Kosovo was no longer sustainable and that the final status process should
commence, an assessment shared by the Secretary-General.58 After reviewing Eide’s
report, the Security Council agreed with that assessment and stated that it supported ‘the
Secretary-General’s intention to start a political process to determine Kosovo’s Future
Status, as foreseen in Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)’ and that it welcomed ‘the
Secretary-General’s readiness to appoint a Special Envoy to lead the Future Status
process.’59

The Secretary-General proposed the appointment of Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy
for supervising the process,60 an appointment welcomed by the President of the Security
Council.61 In addition, the Security Council provided to the Secretary-General for his
‘reference’ certain ‘guiding principles’ for the final status talks that had been developed by
the Contact Group. Those principles called for the ‘launch’ of a ‘process to determine the
future status of Kosovo in accordance with Security Council resolution 1244’ and made
clear that this was a process that the Special Envoy would ‘lead’. 62 The principles asserted
that any ‘solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be unacceptable,’
and that the ‘final decision on the status of Kosovo ‘should’ be endorsed by the Security
Council,’ but also stated that ‘[o]nce the process has started, it cannot be blocked and must
be brought to a conclusion’.63 Ahtisaari’s terms of reference provided that it was he who
would determine the ‘duration’ of the process.64
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After receiving his instructions, Ahtisaari set to work and, over the course of fifteen
months, conducted extensive negotiations with all the relevant parties, including authorities
in Belgrade and Pristina. Most of these meetings took place in Vienna, and while Kosovo
and Serbia were clearly central to them, the meetings also involved a wide array of experts
from the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, international
financial institutions, and others. Progress was made on certain issues that needed to be
dealt with relating to final status, such as on protection of religious heritage, community
rights, decentralization, and economic issues. But on the issue of autonomy versus
independence, the two sides’ positions remained thoroughly entrenched and diametrically
opposed. The government in Belgrade insisted that Kosovo remain a part of Serbia, while
the Kosovo authorities, reflecting the long-standing desire of the people of Kosovo, would
accept nothing less than independence.
President Ahtisaari determined in March 2007 that nothing more could be
accomplished through negotiations. The potential for ‘any mutually agreeable outcome’
was ‘exhausted’. No ‘additional talks, whatever the format could overcome the
‘impasse’.65 Rather, Ahtisaari concluded that ‘the only viable option’ for Kosovo was
independence.66 Consequently, he advanced a ‘Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo
Status Settlement’ and recommended independence – a proposal and recommendation
supported by the Secretary-General.67 Efforts to secure Serbian cooperation with that
proposal (through a Security Council mission to the region and through efforts of the
Troika) failed. In September 2007, the Secretary-General indicated that there was a ‘real
risk of progress beginning to unravel and of instability in Kosovo and the region.’68 In
February 2008, Kosovo’s leaders declared independence.
Serbia and its supporters argued forcefully that this process clearly was not the one
envisaged in Resolution 1244. For them, the Contact Group had issued principles for the
final status negotiations that did not pre-determine independence for Kosovo; indeed, they
65
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stressed key language in those principles to the effect that ‘[a]ny solution that is unilateral
or results from the use of force would be unacceptable’ and that the ‘Security Council will
remain activity seized of the matter. The final decision on the status of Kosovo should be
endorsed by the Security Council.’69 Moreover, they maintained that, from the very
beginning of the process, Ahtisaari took the view that independence was the only viable
option and thus approached the negotiations in a biased and unfair manner.70 Hence, the
actions of Ahtisaari and certain members of the Contact Group created a setting where
Kosovo ‘did not have any incentive to consider any compromise solution to the future
status but stuck to its position that independence was the only option’.71 In fact, Serbia and
its supporters asserted that the process had not been exhausted; Serbia expressed its
continued willingness to negotiate with Kosovo on a wide range of options for the latter’s
autonomy and self-governance.72 Finally, despite Ahtisaari’s assertions, the Security
Council – which had assumed the central role with respect to Kosovo’s fate – had not yet
determined that negotiations were exhausted,73 and the refusal of many states to recognize
Kosovo as a sovereign state demonstrated that such a determination was necessary. If a
stalemate could be said to exist at the Security Council, that alone could not justify
unilateral action by one side to resolve Kosovo’s status. Thus, the declaration of
independence and its unilateral termination of the political process were not in accordance
with Resolution 1244.

By contrast, Kosovo and its supporters maintained that the political process outlined
above was fully in accordance with Resolution 1244. Based on the language of the
‘Guiding Principles,’ they argued that the Security Council fully understood in 2005, even
69
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in the face of strongly held and quite possibly irreconcilable positions in Belgrade and
Pristina, that the Council was launching a political process that could not be blocked and
that would have to reach a conclusion at the end of the process. Further, based on the terms
of reference given to Athisaari, Kosovo and its supporters maintained there was no doubt
that it was thrown to Ahtisaari to decide when and whether the process had run its course.

Moreover,

they

emphasized

that

nowhere

in

the

Secretary-General’s

recommendation and appointment in 2005 of the Special Envoy, nor in his terms of
reference, was it stated that Kosovo’s status could only be determined with the approval of
Serbia or by a Belgrade-Pristina agreement, nor that final status could only be determined
by a further decision of the Security Council. The Council had on many occasions, of
course, included in its resolutions a decision that before a particular step could be taken,
the matter must come back to the Council for approval. Yet, Kosovo and its supporters
noted, no such decision was contained in Resolution 1244. Further, they stressed that the
conclusion by Ahtisaari about the futility of further negotiations was consistent with the
Court’s recognition in the South West Africa cases that there comes a time in negotiations
when ‘a deadlock’ is reached – when ‘both sides remain adamant’ in their positions – in
which case ‘there is no reason to think that the dispute can be settled by further
negotiations between the Parties’.74 Under such circumstances, it could not be said that the
declaration contravened paragraph 11 of Resolution 1244. Rather, the declaration was an
obvious and necessary next step for achieving a final settlement of Kosovo’s status, one
that flowed directly from the conclusions by the very authorities charged by the Security
Council with leading the final status process.

Kosovo’s position, however, raised an important question. By issuing the
declaration, did Kosovo violate Resolution 1244 by terminating, in essence, the functions
of UNMIK, a step presumably only the Security Council could take? 75 Kosovo and its
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supporters noted that the declaration did not in fact terminate or purport to terminate
UNMIK’s functions, and further stressed that Resolution 1244 contemplated a role for
UNMIK in the post-interim period, which UNMIK continued to fulfil even after issuance
of the declaration. Further, Kosovo pointed out that Serbia itself had accepted that the
declaration did not set aside the mandate of UNMIK and that UNMIK continued to
perform certain functions after its adoption.76

The Court basically accepted the position advanced by Kosovo and its supporters
that the issuance of the declaration of independence did not contravene the ‘facilitation’ of
a political process as envisaged in Resolution 1244.77 In the background section of the
advisory opinion, the Court found inter alia that after Ambassador Eide had submitted his
report on Kosovo in 2005, the Security Council had reached consensus that the final status
process should begin;78 that the Secretary-General had then appointed Ahtisaari as his
Special Envoy for the process;79 that several rounds of negotiation between delegates from
Serbia and Kosovo were held over the course of 2006 and 2007;80 that Ahtisaari had
determined in March 2007 that no amount of talks between the parties would result in an
agreement on Kosovo’s future status; and that he recommended independence for
Kosovo.81 With this history in mind, the Court held the declaration of independence did not
contravene Resolution 1244 because ‘the specific contours, let alone the outcome, of the
final status process were left open by Security Council resolution 1244,’ and thus the
Security Council itself’). Judge Koroma pressed the point even further, asserting that ‘Kosovo cannot be
declared independent while the international civil presence continues to exist and operate in the province.
The resolution does not grant the international civil presence the right to alter or terminate the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia’s sovereignty over its territory of Kosovo….’). Ibid., 472, para. 14.
76
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declaration was not prohibited even though ‘it was expected that the final status of Kosovo
would flow from . . . the framework set up by the resolution’.82

Judge Skotnikov

disagreed: ‘[T]he Security Council, in the view of the majority, has created a giant
loophole in the régime it established under resolution 1244 by allowing for a unilateral
“political settlement” of the final status issue.’83

D.

Was the Declaration Inconsistent with the Legal Régime in Kosovo?
If Resolution 1244 itself did not prohibit the declaration of independence, then a

further possibility was that the declaration was not ‘in accordance with’ international law
because it was inconsistent with the legal régime in Kosovo, perhaps as an ultra vires act
of the PISG or a contravention of the regulations adopted by the SRSG on behalf of
UNMIK, including the 2001 Constitutional Framework.84 This line of argument principally
entailed two issues: first, was a violation of the legal régime set up in Kosovo after 1999 a
violation of international law (as referred to in the question put forward by the General
Assembly) or was more akin to a violation of national law?; and, if the former, (2) were the
authors of the declaration actors bound by that régime?

1.

Kosovo’s Legal Régime as International Law

Kosovo and its supporters claimed that, even if arguendo the declaration constituted
an ultra vires act by the PISG or violated the 2001 Constitutional Framework, such action
was not a violation of international law, but was a violation of the national law applicable
in Kosovo (that is local law established for the interim administration of Kosovo). In this
respect, the declaration would have been ultra vires only in the same way that most
declarations of independence are—as a contravention of the constitutional or other national
law of the state concerned, but not as a contravention of international law.85
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By contrast, Serbia and its supporters argued that UNMIK regulations, including the
Constitutional Framework, were international law. Resolution 1244 established UNMIK as
the international civilian presence in Kosovo and empowered the SRSG to issue
regulations on behalf of UNMIK. Among other things, UNMIK established the PISG and
placed the SRSG in a position of overseeing compliance of the PISG with the interim
arrangements, including the protection of international human rights. UNMIK, therefore,
was a subsidiary body of the United Nations and its regulations had an international nature
to them.86 Such regulations were clearly pursuant to UN legal authority, not pursuant to
any national or local authority, and hence the nature of the legal régime was international.

Here the Court accepted the position advanced by Serbia and its supporters, finding
that:

‘UNMIK regulations, including regulation 2001/9, which promulgated the
Constitutional Framework, are adopted by the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the basis of the authority derived from Security Council resolution 1244
(1999), notably its paragraphs 6, 10, and 11, and thus ultimately from the United
Nations Charter. This Constitutional Framework derives its binding force from the
binding character of resolution 1244 (1999) and thus from international law. In that
sense it possesses an international legal character.’87
The Court went on to state that Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework
‘constituted the international law application to the situation prevailing in Kosovo on 17
February 2008.’88

At the same time, in the course of this part of its analysis, the Court indicated that the
‘Constitutional Framework functions as part of a specific legal order … which is
applicable only in Kosovo and the purpose of which is to regulate, during the interim
phase established by resolution 1244 (1999), matters which would ordinarily be the subject
of internal, rather than international law.’89 The Court’s emphasis on the limited scope of
such ‘international law’ – geographically limited to Kosovo and temporally limited to just
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the interim period – was consistent with its characterization of Resolution 1244 itself as
establishing ‘a temporary, exceptional régime,’ and appears to have played an important
part when considering the specific actor that declared independence, as discussed in the
next sub-section. In short, the Court appears to have viewed such law as a sui generis
international legal order.90

In his separate opinion, Judge Yusuf disagreed with the Court’s analysis; he felt the
Constitutional Framework was not a part of international law. In his view, the Court was
conflating ‘the source of the authority for the promulgation of the Kosovo regulations and
the nature of the regulations themselves.’91 International administrators of territory have a
‘dual capacity,’ such that while ‘they act under the authority of international institutions
such as the United Nations, the regulations they adopt belong to the domestic legal order of
the territory under international administration.’92 Among other things, he noted that
UNMIK’s regulations operated in tandem with the local law in force in Kosovo as of
March 1989;93 the regulations were simply a ‘part of a territorially-based legislation which
was enacted solely and exclusively for the administration of that territory.’94 As such, for
Judge Yusuf, there was no need to reach the issue of whether the authors of the declaration
were part of the PISG; even if they were, there was no violation of international law.

2.

Applicability of Kosovo’s Legal Régime to the Authors of the Declaration

Having determined that Kosovo’s legal régime was a form of international law, the
Court then addressed whether that régime precluded the authors of the declaration from
acting as they did. This issue turned principally on whether the authors were acting as the
PISG or whether the authors instead were simply a group of democratically-elected leaders
of Kosovo undertaking an act that was not an exercise of PISG authority. In addressing that
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issue, two elements ultimately proved important: what was the entity trying to do and how
did it do it?

According to Serbia and its supporters, there was no question the declaration had
been adopted by the PISG. The PISG’s Assembly met in its chamber and adopted the
declaration on 17 February 2008. Subsequent practice in the form of statements by a
variety of relevant actors, including governments, the SRSG, and the Secretary-General, all
confirmed the view that it was the PISG Assembly that declared independence. Even the
UN General Assembly, when it posed its question to the Court, saw no difficulty in
regarding the relevant actor as the PISG.95 Since Resolution 1244 had detailed the scope
of the powers to be exercised by the PISG and had conferred on it ‘substantial autonomy’
and ‘self-governance,’ but not a power to declare independence, then the declaration
violated the resolution.96 Likewise, the Constitutional Framework adopted by the SRSG
limited the extent of the external powers to be exercised by the PISG,97 limitations the
declaration flagrantly violated.98 Finally, Serbia and its supporters also maintained that
even if the authors of the declaration were not the PISG, they were still bound by the
international legal régime that had been established for Kosovo.99

By contrast, Kosovo and its supporters maintained that the declaration was not
adopted by the PISG. They noted that the PISG were a series of institutions that did not act
as a collective, even in their normal functioning. Moreover, even if the Court was to focus
on a portion of the PISG (such as the Assembly), Kosovo and its supporters argued that –
given the form and content of the declaration and the procedure for adopting it – the
declaration differed from the legislative acts normally adopted by the PISG Assembly.
Rather, this particular action was of a special and extraordinary nature that simply could
not be judged as the act of a body established under the SRSG’s provisional Constitutional
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Framework and charged with day-to-day governing responsibilities in Kosovo during the
interim period.100

In addition to focusing on the process for adopting the declaration, Kosovo and its
supporters emphasized the objective of the declaration. Even if this action of the
representatives of Kosovo, meeting as a constituent body, were to be regarded as an action
of the PISG Assembly, Kosovo and its supporters maintained that the legality of that action
could not be judged against standards set forth in either Resolution 1244 or UNMIK
regulations for governance during the interim period. Since the final status settlement
process had concluded, issuance of the declaration was not an act of an interim institution
transgressing its limited authority; rather, it was an act of a constituent body declaring in
the name of the people its readiness to exercise governing authority on a permanent basis,
as contemplated by the political process that unfolded pursuant to Resolution 1244.101

The Court agreed with Kosovo and its supporters on this point. Interestingly, the
Court paid somewhat less attention to the form and procedure for adopting the declaration,
and more to the content and purpose of the declaration. The Court agreed that there were
some indications that the issuance of the declaration was an act of the PISG Assembly and
President of Kosovo, but the Court asserted that the ‘larger context’ was that the final
status negotiations relating to Kosovo had run their course, leaving a situation where
resolution of that status was at hand.102 Resolution 1244 set forth no ‘specific contours’ for
the resolution of that status103 nor did the Constitutional Framework which, by definition,
was concerned with the interim period. By contrast, the declaration, in content and
purpose, concerned Kosovo’s final status, as the Court explained in a key passage:

‘The declaration of independence reflects the awareness of its authors that the final
status negotiations had failed and that a critical moment for the future of Kosovo had
been reached. The preamble of the declaration refers to the “years of internationallysponsored negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina over the question of our future
political status’ and expressly puts the declaration in the context of the failure of the
final status negotiations, inasmuch as it states that ‘no mutually acceptable status
100
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outcome was possible” (tenth and eleventh preambular paragraphs). Proceeding from
there, the authors of the declaration of independence emphasize their determination
to “resolve” the status of Kosovo and to give the people of Kosovo “clarity about
their future” (thirteenth preambular paragraph). This language indicates that the
authors of the declaration did not seek to act within the standard framework of
interim self-administration of Kosovo, but aimed at establishing Kosovo “as an
independent and sovereign State” (para. 1). The declaration of independence,
therefore, was not intended by those who adopted it to take effect within the legal
order created for the interim phase, nor was it capable of doing so. On the contrary,
the Court considers that the authors of that declaration did not act, or intend to act, in
the capacity of an institution created by and empowered to act within that legal order
but, rather, set out to adopt a measure the significance and effects of which would lie
outside that order.’104
The Court went on to note certain aspects of the form and procedure for adopting the
resolution, which also suggested that it was not the work of the PISG Assembly as such.105
Ultimately, the Court concluded that, ‘taking all factors together, the authors of the
declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not act as one of the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government within the Constitutional Framework, but rather as persons
who acted together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the
framework of the interim administration.’106 Given that fact, it followed ‘that the authors of
the declaration of independence were not bound by the framework of powers and
responsibilities established to govern the conduct’ of the PISG and that the declaration ‘did
not violate the Constitutional Framework.’107 Consequently, there was no need to reach the
issue of whether such an act by the PISG would violate Kosovo’s legal régime.

This portion of the Court’s opinion elicited the greatest and sharpest substantive
disagreement among the judges, and also appears to have elicited the greatest criticism
from commentators. Vice-President Tomka felt that the Court’s conclusion had ‘no sound
basis in the facts relating to the adoption of the declaration, and is nothing more than a post
hoc intellectual construct.’108 Judge Koroma chastised the Court for its reliance on the
‘perceived intent’ of the authors; relying ‘on such intent leads to absurd results, as any
given group – secessionists, insurgents – could circumvent international legal norms
104
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specifically targeting them by claiming to have reorganized themselves under another
name.’109 For him, such reasoning was ‘a kind of judicial sleight-of-hand,’110 Similarly,
Judge Bennouna dryly observed that if the Court’s ‘reasoning is followed to its end, it
would be enough to become an outlaw, as it were, in order to escape having to comply
with the law.’111 Judge Skotnikov agreed, lamenting that the Court did ‘not explain the
difference between acting outside the legal order and violating it.’112 Judge SepúlvedaAmor, who supported the outcome, felt that a more plausible reading of the record, despite
the linguistic and procedural peculiarities of the declaration, was that the PISG Assembly
did adopt the declaration, and therefore the Court should have proceeded to assess the
legality of the declaration under Kosovo’s legal régime.113

Two further aspects of this part of the Court’s opinion merit mention. First, the Court
did not see itself as bound to the factual assertion of the General Assembly contained in the
resolution that asked for the Court’s advice. The Assembly’s resolution recalled that ‘on 17
February 2008 the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo declared
independence from Serbia’ and then asked the Court whether the declaration ‘by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government’ was in accordance with international law.114
Judges Bennouna and Koroma regarded the General Assembly’s resolution as evidence
that it was the PISG that issued the declaration.115 The Court, however, stated that it
‘would be incompatible with the proper exercise of the judicial function for the Court to
treat that matter has having been determined by the General Assembly,’116 and that it must
‘examine the entire record and decide for itself.’117 The Court did not indicate, however,
whether such statements were limited to this particular context (a request for advice from
the General Assembly regarding conduct of an institution established under Security
Council authority) or were equally applicable in other contexts (such as a request for
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advice from the Security Council that implicated a factual determination in a Chapter VII
resolution).

Second, although the Court did not say as much, its conclusion that the authors of the
declaration ‘acted together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo’118
may have been necessary so as to distinguish the situation in Kosovo from other situations
where a minority regime is declaring a new state for the purpose of minority rule, as
occurred in 1965 in Southern Rhodesia.119 Yet, as one critic notes, while ‘pointing out that
the authors of the declaration had the capacity to act as representatives of the people of
Kosovo, the Court ignored the crucial question, namely from where this capacity derives. It
derives from the institutions of self-government.’120

E.

What Significance Should Be Accorded to the Reactions of UN Officials Charged
with Overseeing Implementation of Resolution 1244?
Resolution 1244 charged the international civilian presence in Kosovo with

‘overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions in
Kosovo’.121 Further, the Constitutional Framework adopted by the SRSG stated that he
would take ‘appropriate measures whenever [PISG] actions are inconsistent with UNSCR
1244 (1999) or this Constitutional Framework’.122 Prior to the 2008 declaration of
independence, the SRSG on several occasions had taken steps to prevent or set aside
actions or declarations by Kosovo authorities that constituted a move toward
independence.123 Yet neither the SRSG nor the Secretary-General himself set aside the
2008 declaration or declared it null and void.

Thus, the two sides in the Kosovo

proceedings were confronted with an important issue: what significance should be
accorded to such inaction?
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Serbia and its supporters argued that such inaction was simply not relevant when
assessing the legality of the declaration. For them, the Secretary-General and the SRSG
were acting—or rather not acting—in Kosovo under the overall authority of the Security
Council, and it was common knowledge that its members disagreed on the question of
whether the declaration was legal or illegal.124 As such, the Secretary-General and the
SRSG were simply acting neutrally and nothing could be surmised from that posture.
Furthermore, Resolution 1244 did not oblige the Security Council to act to identify a
breach of that resolution; when coupled with the inability to act due to the divergent views
of its members, the Security Council’s inaction could not be interpreted as tacit recognition
of the legality of the declaration.125 They also asserted that, after the declaration, the SRSG
had continued to amend draft laws of the PISG, which demonstrated that the SRSG did not
accept Kosovo as now independent,126 and that the Secretary-General and the SRSG were
waiting for a legal opinion on Kosovo’s declaration from the Undersecretary-General for
Legal Affairs of the United Nations, which could explain their inaction.127

By contrast, Kosovo and its supporters argued that the failure by the ‘supreme
administrative authority’128 in Kosovo to set aside the declaration had to weigh heavily
against Serbia’s claim that the declaration violated Resolution 1244. They noted that the
SRSG and other UN officials were fully aware of the declaration and the possibility that it
violated the UN civilian presence in Kosovo. Indeed, after issuance of the declaration,
Serbia formally demanded that the Secretary-General take steps to have the declaration set
aside by instructing the SRSG to that effect. The Secretary-General did not do so. Nor did
the Security Council, either by resolution or through a statement of its President, take any
steps to instruct the Secretary-General or his representatives to set aside the declaration. As
such, according to Kosovo and its supporters, such inaction supported the proposition that
the issuance of the declaration did not violate Resolution 1244.129
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The Court found that the silence of the SRSG in the face of the declaration of
independence was of ‘some significance’ because it suggested the SRSG did not consider
the declaration to be an act of the PISG designed to take effect under Resolution 1244’s
legal order.130 Had the SRSG thought otherwise, the Court reasoned, practice had shown
the SRSG would have found the act to be incompatible with the Constitutional
Framework.131 Judge Bennouna, however, was not convinced, finding that:

‘the deadlock in the United Nations bodies during the process to determine Kosovo’s
future status does not justify the conclusion that a unilateral declaration of
independence hitherto not in accordance with international law is suddenly deserving
of an imprimatur of compliance. In fact, the reason why the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General took no action was not that he considered the declaration to
be in accordance with international law, but simply that the political body to which
he was answerable was unable to reach a decision on advancing in the process under
way to determine the future status of Kosovo.’132
Likewise, in his declaration, Vice-President Tomka highlighted what he saw as a
conundrum with the Court’s position: ‘why acts which were considered as going beyond
the competences of the Provisional Institutions in the period 2002-2005, would no longer
have any such character in 2008, despite the fact that provisions of the Constitutional
Framework on the competencies of these institutions have not been amended and remained
the same in February 2008 as they were in 2005.’133

3.

Broader Ramifications of the Advisory Opinion for Interpretation and
Application of Security Council Resolutions
Having recounted in some detail the five core arguments regarding the legality of the

declaration in relation to Resolution 1244, this part turns to several especially important
ramifications of the Court’s analysis for future interpretation and application of Security
Council resolutions.

130

Kosovo Advisory Opinion (n 29), 447, para. 108.

131

Ibid.; but see Vidmar (n 120), at 330 (suggesting an alternative possibility: the SRSG did not think the
declaration violated the existing legal régime whether or not it was issued by the PISG).

132

Dissenting Op. Judge Bennouna, [2010] ICJ Rep 500, 512–13, para. 60.

133

Decl. Vice-President Tomka, [2010] ICJ Rep 454, 466, para. 34.

30

A.

Security Council Resolutions as Lex Specialis

While this chapter is not focused on the Court’s treatment of general international
law, the Court’s approach to that law in relation to Resolution 1244 bears mention.
Arguably Resolution 1244 constituted a form of lex specialis that should have largely or
wholly displaced general international law. Even if Resolution 1244 left open resolution of
Kosovo’s final status, the Security Council had ‘entered the field’ sufficiently – in its
displacement of FRY military and police authority in Kosovo, its establishment of an
internationally-administered interim regime, and its assigning to the SRSG the task of
promoting the final status negotiations – such that whatever rules of general international
law that normally exist had now been overtaken.

The Court, however, did not view Resolution 1244 as a lex specialis that displaced
all other norms of international law. Rather, the Court turned first134 to ‘certain questions
concerning the lawfulness of declarations of independence under general international law,
against the background of which the question posed falls to be considered, and Security
Council resolution 1244 (1999) is to be understood and applied.’135 This approach suggests
that, when construing a Security Council resolution, it may be important to consider the
baseline of international law within which the Council is operating, as it may provide
insights into the assumed premises upon which the resolution was predicated. The Council
adopted Resolution 1244 in 1999 against a background where ‘general international law
contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence,’136 which made it even
more plausible to assert that any such prohibition, if intended, should have been expressly
stated in the resolution. Such an approach is well-considered; in circumstances where the
Council’s resolution is ambiguous or open-textured, it seems likely that the special rules of
the resolution are meant to be applying general international law rather than modifying,
overruling or setting aside that law.137
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B.

Methodology When Interpreting Security Council Resolutions

The Court’s advisory opinion provides some guidance on the proper methodology for
interpreting Security Council resolutions.138 First, the Court viewed Articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)139 as capable of providing
‘guidance’ for the interpretation Security Council resolutions,140 an approach consistent
with the Court’s prior jurisprudence and that of some other international tribunals.141 As
such, the Court appears to favor a good faith interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the
terms of a Security Council resolution; to that end, the Court asserted that it was engaging
in ‘a careful reading’ of Resolution 1244142 and parsed the specific wording of several
provisions of the resolution, both for what they said143 and what they did not say.144

Further, the Court’s reference to the Vienna Convention suggests that the terms of
the resolution should be considered in context (e.g., with regard to the preamble and
annexes) and in light of the resolution’s object and purpose. In fact, the Court read the
provisions of Resolution 1244 in conjunction with its annexes 1 and 2,145 and identified
‘three distinct features of that resolution [that] are relevant for discerning its object and
purpose,’ 146 which the Court concluded ‘was to establish a temporary, exceptional régime
Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, paras. 88–107 (13 Apr. 2006), as corrected UN Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1 (Aug. 11, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi).
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which, save to the extent that it expressly preserved it, superseded the Serbian legal order
and which aimed at the stabilization of Kosovo, and that it was designed to do so on an
interim basis.’147 This view of the object and purpose of the resolution proved important to
the Court’s determination that the resolution operated ‘on a different level’ than the
declaration; the former focused on the interim period and the latter focused on Kosovo’s
final status.148

Finally, the Court’s assessment of general international law (as noted in the prior
section) might reflect an interpretive approach that takes into account ‘relevant rules of
international law applicable’149 to those affected by the resolution, though the Court did not
characterize its analysis in those terms.

Second, the Court also indicated ‘other factors to be taken into account’ that are
specific to the interpretation of a Security Council resolution, by stating that such
interpretation ‘may require the Court to analyse statements made at the time of their
adoption, other resolutions of the Security Council on the same issue, as well as the
subsequent practice of the relevant United Nations organs and of States affected by those
given resolutions.’150 As previously noted, the Court compared the language of Resolution
1244 with the Council’s contemporaneous adoption of Resolution 1251 (1999) relating to
Cyprus,151 compared it with prior resolutions relating to Kosovo,152 and took into account
for interpretive purposes the actions of the Secretary-General and the SRSG to implement
the resolution.153 The Court did not, however, refer to any statements made by the
members of the Council at the time Resolution 1244 was adopted.
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Third, the Court listed with apparent approval the methodology it used in prior cases
for interpreting and applying Security Council resolutions.154 In particular, the Court
confirmed its view in the South West Africa advisory opinion that the interpretation of a
resolution must be undertaken ‘on a case-by-case basis, considering all relevant
circumstances,’ not just when determining whether the Council intended to create a
binding legal obligation, but for other interpretive purposes as well.155

C.

Judicial Deference When Reviewing Security Council Resolutions

There is little doubt that the Court is properly engaged in the exercise of its judicial
function when interpreting a Security Council resolution, if necessary for deciding a case
or issuing an advisory opinion. Even so, an important question arises as to whether there
should be special deference or caution exercised by the Court, given the Council’s status as
a collateral UN organ, one that is often engaged in politically difficult and sensitive issues
of peace and security. The Court is no doubt wary of misinterpreting a Council resolution
or ascribing to the Council or its Members that they did not in fact hold, especially if doing
so might have serious and adverse consequences. Such deference might implicitly be seen
in two aspects of the Kosovo advisory opinion.

First, given that a central aspect of the advisory opinion was the interpretation of a
Security Council resolution, a plausible basis for the Court to decline to answer the
question was the fact that the request came from the General Assembly. Indeed, VicePresident Tomka in his declaration, Judge Keith in his separate opinion, and Judges
Bennouna and Skotnikov in their dissenting opinions all asserted that for this reason the
Court should have declined to answer the question.156 The only prior advisory opinion
154
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where the interpretation of a Security Council resolution was central to disposition of the
issue – the South West Africa advisory opinion – involved a request from the Council, not
the Assembly.157

In Kosovo, the Court did not decline to answer the question; indeed, some judges
thought that interpretation of any Council resolution related to peace and security was an
appropriate basis for the Court to engage in its advisory function, regardless of who asked
the question.158 As Richard Falk notes, the decision ‘seemed partly to reflect a sense of
institutional responsibility, namely, that the Court should always do its best not to rely on
its discretion to decline to respond whenever a major UN organ poses an international law
question to it.’159 Nevertheless, the Court took this issue seriously, spending several
paragraphs of the opinion explaining why the question could be answered notwithstanding
that the request emanated from the Assembly.160 As such, the posture of the case may have
led the Court to be especially cautious in reaching a decision that ascribed views to the
Council that were not readily apparent from the resolution, such as a view that any
unilateral declaration was prohibited, that the Council had to approve Kosovo’s
independence, or that the Council expected Serbia’s consent prior to independence.

Second, as noted above, Kosovo and its supporters argued that it fell to the SRSG to
determine whether the declaration was an ultra vires act or an act that violated the
Constitutional Framework. Since the SRSG took no such action, they maintained that the
declaration was not such an act. As noted above,161 the Court accepted that position,
finding that the SRSG was ‘under a duty to take action with regard to the acts of the
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Assembly of Kosovo which he considered to be ultra vires.’162 Since the SRSG did not
take action, the Court concluded that the actor at issue was not the Assembly or the PISG
as a whole.

In reaching that conclusion, the Court may have been influenced by the fact that the
Security Council had delegated authority to the Secretary-General and his Special
Representative and, in so doing, provided those officials with authority to interpret the
Council’s resolution as the need arose in theatre. While inaction by the Council itself might
readily be viewed as purely a product of a political deadlock, the Court may have seen it as
necessary to regard the conduct of the Secretary-General and his representatives as
different—as more apolitical in nature. In other words, perhaps the Court felt it necessary
to preserve the idea that international civil servants are charged with implementing UN
institutional law to the best of their abilities, without regard to the political consequences.
As such, in considering whether there was a transgression in theatre of the rules adopted by
the SRSG to regulate local matters (such as the provisional Constitutional Framework),
considerable weight should be accorded to that representative to interpret whether a
transgression has occurred and, if so, to correct it. In this instance, the Court may have
viewed the SRSG’s decision not to declare null or set aside the declaration as an ultra vires
act of the PISG, or as a violation of the Constitutional Framework, as an authoritative or
highly persuasive interpretation of Resolution 1244 to which the Court should defer, at
least in the absence of strong reasons to the contrary. One might argue that the SRSG’s
failure to act was ‘a breach of his mandate,’163 but that leads to the question of why the
Secretary-General did not act to correct the SRSG, which in turn leads to a question of
whether the Secretary-General violated his mandate.164 Presumably the Court would only
reluctantly go down such a path.

D.

Ability of the Security Council to Bind Non-State Actors
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Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the Security Council to decide upon
measures that shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.165
Notably in this context, it ‘may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the
United Nations to apply such measures.’166 UN Member States agree to accept and carry
out those decisions.167 While such provisions clearly empower the Council to order or
authorize states to take action, they do not expressly address whether the Council can order
or authorize other actors, including non-Member States,168 international organizations,
non-governmental organizations, or persons to take action.

Even so, the Council at times addresses its resolutions to non-state actors and the
failure of those actors to abide by the resolution might be regarded as a violation of
international law. In Resolution 1244, the Council demanded ‘that the KLA and other
armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the
requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security
presence,’169 just as it demanded that ‘that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo’.170 Perhaps a failure of
the KLA to end offensive actions would violate Resolution 1244 in the same way that a
failure of the FRY to end violence and repression in Kosovo would violate Resolution
1244.

Yet given that the Court normally regulates states and not non-state actors, it is
appropriate to scrutinize carefully any given resolution to see whether it binds a non-state
actor and, if so, in what way. Interestingly, in situations involving a declaration of
independence, the Council (or the General Assembly) typically does not demand that the
165
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relevant actor refrain from issuing a declaration or withdraw a declaration that has been
issued, nor decide that the declaration as such violates international law.171 Rather, the
Council condemns the issuance of a declaration and decides that it should not be given
legal effect by the United Nations or Member States.172 In other words, the approach taken
is not to impose an obligation on the non-state actor but, rather, to make a determination as
to the legal effect of that actor’s conduct.173

For example, in 1965, the Security Council (without invoking Chapter VII)
condemned ‘the unilateral declaration of independence made by a racist minority in
Southern Rhodesia,’ decided to call upon ‘all States not to recognize this illegal racist
minority régime,’174 and regarded ‘the declaration of independence by it as having no legal
validity’.175 No part of the relevant resolutions ordered the minority regime to undertake
any specific acts. The reference to ‘illegal’ regime and an ‘invalid’ declaration might be
interpreted as recognition that the action violated national law,176 but the Court in the
Kosovo case saw it as arising from the actor’s connection to egregious human rights
violations.177 After Southern Rhodesia proclaimed itself a republic, the Council invoked
Chapter VII, condemned the ‘illegal proclamation of republican status,’ and called upon
states to refrain from recognition,178 but again issued no decision or demand directed at the
minority regime.
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Similarly, in 1983, the Council considered the declaration of independence by
Turkish Cypriot authorities as incompatible with certain treaty commitments and, for that
reason, the attempt to create a new state was ‘legally invalid;’ the Council further called
upon ‘all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus’.179
Again, the resolution did not order the Turkish Cypriot authorities to undertake any
specific acts. More recently, the Security Council adopted a resolution relating to Bosnia
and Herzegovina in which it addressed the possibility of the issuance of a declaration of
independence for the establishment of a new State of Republika Srpska. Resolution 787
provided that the Security Council ‘[st]rongly reaffirms its call on all parties and others
concerned to respect strictly the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
affirms that any entities unilaterally declared or arrangements imposed in contravention
thereof will not be accepted.’180 Again, the Security Council did not directly address the
relevant non-state actor or address the legality of a potential declaration but, rather, simply
indicated that the Council would not accept such an act.

In the Kosovo advisory opinion, the Court apparently accepted that the Council had
the power to ‘make demands’ upon non-state actors, but concluded that, in Resolution
1244, the Council in fact did not issue any demand directed at the Kosovo Albanian
leadership with respect to a declaration of independence. As such, the Court could not
‘accept the argument’ that the resolution contained ‘a prohibition, binding on the authors of
the declaration of independence, against declaring independence….’181 Moreover, the
Court may have been influenced by the fact that the declaration – rather than the work of a
non-state actor advancing egregious human rights violations – sought to incorporate the
human rights and other provisions proposed by Ahtisaari for the final settlement.182 In so
deciding, the Court did not reach the issue of whether Security Council demands in fact
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establish binding legal obligations for those non-state actors and, if so, whether the
contravention of those demands violates international law.183

Judge Bennouna asserted that Resolution 1244 was binding upon ‘non-State actors in
Kosovo,’ but indicated that it was binding ‘as a result of the territory [of Kosovo] having
been placed under United Nations administration.’184 Even if the declaration was issued by
a group of individuals representing the people of Kosovo (and not the PISG), he asked
‘how is it possible for them to have been able to violate the legal order established by
UNMIK under the Constitutional Framework, which all inhabitants of Kosovo are
supposed to respect?’185 Judge Skotnikov also appears to have viewed the resolution as
directly binding upon non-state actors in Kosovo; he cited to a statement made by the U.K.
government, when Resolution 1244 was adopted, to the effect that the resolution ‘applies
also in full to the Kosovo Albanians’ and that the ‘Kosovo Albanian people and its
leadership must rise to the challenge of peace by accepting the obligations of the
resolution….’186

E.

International Territorial Administration

International administration of territory is not a new phenomenon in the history of
international law,187 but recent interventions in places such as Kosovo, East Timor, Eastern
Slavonia, and elsewhere have given new significance to the phenomenon.188 Moreover, the
assumption of direct administrative authority by the United Nations appears to be a new
development; prior practice, such as under the trusteeship system, did not involve the
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United Nations itself as an administering authority.189 Three aspects of the Court’s opinion
seem especially important for this issue.

First, in the immediate aftermath of the deployment of UNMIK (and comparable
deployments elsewhere), questions were raised as to whether the Security Council had the
power to establish such an international administration, given its considerable intrusiveness
into national sovereignty.190 Although the issue was not directly raised in the proceedings,
the Court’s opinion implicitly accepts that the United Nations, at least through a Chapter
VII decision of the Security Council, is empowered to engage in such administration of
territory – a dramatic and perhaps revolutionary assumption of sovereign power –
notwithstanding a lack of express authority in the UN Charter. To what extent that
acceptance is based on a theory of maintaining peace and security under Chapter VII, or
upon a theory of trusteeship,191 cannot be discerned from the opinion. Nevertheless, such
acceptance, in conjunction with the tacit acceptance by states generally, suggests a ‘new
normal’ for UN territorial administration. At the same time, the Court did not reach the
more difficult issue of whether the Council may order the final political status of a territory
in the absence of the agreement of the relevant parties.192

Second, the Court’s approach also accepted the ability of the Security Council to
delegate to the Secretary-General the power of creating the international civilian presence
(UNMIK). Previously the Court had implicitly accepted the power of the Council itself to
create a freestanding body such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia;193 here, the Council implicitly accepted – albeit for an interim period – the
189
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ability of the Secretary-General under the authority of the Council to create and establish
the responsibilities of an entity that exercised core sovereign functions within the
administered territory, with cascading effects that flowed to the SRSG and PISG.194

Third, the Court’s conclusion that the legal régime associated with UNMIK’s
presence in Kosovo was a form of international law195 provides some guidance for how to
view such deployments, and appears consistent with the views that were expressed in the
academic community prior to issuance of the opinion. Writing in 2001, Carsten Stahn
characterized UNMIK regulations as ‘a specific source of law, placing Kosovo …
provisionally under the legal order of the United Nations.’196 Although such regulations
also constitute ‘internal acts of the administered ‘internationalized’ territories,’ the ultimate
result was arguably a fusion of municipal and UN law so as to create a ‘law of the
internationalized territory which constitutes a legal entity of its own, separate from the
United Nations.’197 Similarly, Erika de Wet asserted in 2004 that such regulations, though
possessing a ‘dual character,’ nevertheless ‘belong to the legal order of the United Nations
as they are enacted by subsidiary organs of the Security Council within the meaning of
Article 29 of the Charter.’198 As such, while the law may possess a dual character, the
Court’s assessment that violation of that law could be ‘not in accordance with international
law’ seems entirely plausible.

In the aftermath of the opinion, some commentators have asserted that the Court’s
approach meant that, in essence, the Court assumed the role of the ‘Constitutional Court’
of Kosovo;199 however, such a position seems overdrawn. Most issues concerning laws
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operative in internationally-administered territory will be resolved by the institutions
operating within that territory, where the characterization of the law as “international” or
not has no real significance. In rare circumstances where the Court has jurisdiction and an
issue is presented that requires passing upon an aspect of such law, then the Court may
well regard the law as having an international character. Even so, it remains possible that
particular types of regulations – due to their origin or nature – might be seen as possessing
such a dominantly local character (e.g., a rule barring trucks on certain roads) that they do
not truly implicate international law; such circumstances simply were not at issue in the
Kosovo case, and the opinion provides no guidance in that respect.

4.

Conclusion

The Court’s findings in the Kosovo case with respect to Resolution 1244 provide a
rich mosaic of issues, some of which were specific to the situation of Kosovo and others
that have ramifications for the interpretation and application of Security Council
resolutions more generally. While doubts and disagreements with the Court’s decision can
be fairly expressed, the Court rather systematically addressed the principal legal arguments
placed before it, and there is nothing about the opinion that operates outside the realm of
plausible judicial reasoning. Though the Court was faced with the difficult situation of an
ambiguous resolution and a divided Council, as well as blocs of states with diametrically
opposed views, the Court assumed its responsibility of answering the question and
answered it clearly, without unleashing any apparent adverse consequences for the United
Nations, for the Balkans, or for the international rule of law more generally.
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